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The current drought conditions that the Central California coast has
been facing and the increasing threat of saltwater intrusion have forced
the Salinas Valley to consider alternatives that provide for conserving
and allocating limited groundwater resources. Currently, groundwater
resources are treated as a common pool resource where there are no
clearly defined property rights for groundwater and there is no regulation
of use. This thesis examines the question of how to implement a market
system for groundwater in the Salinas Valley. The study compares a free-
market approach of water allocation to other centralized water manage-
ment practices. This study found that, in theory, the establishment of
clearly defined groundwater rights and a free market system for ground-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water conservation, water rights, and an efficient allocation of water
resources are now central issues in California public policy. These issues
are of particular importance in the Salinas Valley, where agriculture has
undergone extensive development since the 1920s and is the primary
user of water resources. In the Salinas Valley, irrigation water for crop
production is obtained almost exclusively from local wells.
A 1983 water-use survey, by the United States Geological Survey,
indicated that mean agricultural water use in the study area (Sali-
nas Valley) was 512,200 acre-ftl/year or 91.5 percent of ground-
water outflow in the Salinas Valley." [Ref. l:p. 19]
Because of the proximity of the area to the ocean, large rates of ground-
water pumping cause the inflow of seawater into the coastal aquifers. The
increased threat of saltwater intrusion and the current drought condition
that the central coast has been facing force the Salinas Valley to consider
alternatives that provide for conserving and allocating limited ground-
water resources.
Economists recognize that the free market provides the most effi-
cient allocation of scarce resources by providing economic incentives to
the users [Ref. 2:pp. 64-651. This thesis examines the question of how to
implement a free market system for agricultural groundwater in the Sali-
nas Valley Water District and forecasts the effects this market allocation
'An acre-foot is equal to approximately 333,333 gallons.
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would have on water conservation and the allocation of water resources.
Specifically, the thesis will cover three major areas: a discussion of the
current drought conditions in the Salinas Valley and the importance of
the agricultural community to the state and local economy, a brief
description of groundwater law and models to privatize groundwater, and
a comparison cf a free market system of allocating groundwater
resources to both a tax system where groundwater is taxed as it is
extracted and a maximum standard system where a limit is set on the
amount of water that can be extracted.
A. OVERVIEW
The people of the United States have been blessed with an abun-
dance of natural resources, to include a seemingly never-ending supply
of fresh water. According to Eugene W. Weber, formerly Chief of Civil
Works Planning and Deputy Director of Civil Works for Policy, Office of
the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, in his review of water
usage in the United States:
Most of the nation was endowed with a generous supply of this vital
resource. For many years it was not necessary to plan how to use it
but merely to exploit it and reap the blessings of the endowment.
From the beginning of our history as a nation, there have been pro-
phetic warnings at infrequent intervals of need for planning ahead.
Most of these warnings went unheeded locally and nationally until
recent years [mid-1970s]. [Ref. 3:p. 6]
Today, limitations on the water supply for household, agricultural,
and industrial use in the United States are a growing problem. Two
major threats to existing water supplies are pollution, which reduces the
amount of usable water, and overdrafting, which means that demand on
2
a water source is greater than what nature is capable of replenishing.
Pollution and overdrafting contribute to declining groundwater levels,
which threaten local economies that depend on water from underground
sources. Therefore, the planning and managing of this precious resource
is critical, not only for economic reasons, but in the long term to sustain
life.
Although seven-tenths of the world is covered with water (i.e., about
326,000,000 cubic miles of water), only 2.5 percent of this is fresh X iter,
and more than 75 percent of that is locked up in the polar ice caps. Of all
the water on earth, only 0.6 percent is liquid fresh water. Six-tenths of
one percent does not sound like much water, but it amounts to approxi-
mately 2 million cubic miles. This would be a sufficient amount to sus-
tain the 5.2 billion humans on earth today, but unfortunately this water
is not distributed according to human needs. As a consequence, there
are more than one billion people in the world with insufficient access to
drinking water [Ref. 4:p. 451. Because of this, water resource manage-
ment has become a key economic and political issue. But are we doing all
we can do? At best, the demand for water is staying the same, while the
supply of usable water is declining.
California has been particularly hard-hit when it comes to the
amount of available water resources. Hal Rubin of the California State
University at Sacramento said that "water has broken more alliances and
friendships in California than alcohol." [Ref. 4:p. 481 Back in 1850, when
California became a state, the "frontier was still open. California had few
people, vast open spaces, and large amounts of natural resources." [Ref.
3
5:p. 1] These early settlers, be they farmers, miners, or housewives, had
no need to and did not account for the impact their use of resources
made on the environment. But as California developed from a frontier to
a modern society, so did the resource accounting and distribution sys-
tems. The present demand on California water resources makes the
accounting for and distribution of water a very complex process.
Nature provides the largest portion of California's water during win-
ter and spring, whereas the largest demands occur in the summer
and fall. Fifty-five percent of California's water supply comes from
the northern one-third of the state, but 75 percent of the use occurs
in the central and southern two-thirds of the state. Thus, the water
system must store water across time and transport it across space
to meet the demands of water users. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
B. GROUNDWATER
Groundwater is the water that occurs below the surface of the Earth,
where it occupies all or part of the void spaces in a geological layer or
layers. It is also called subsurface water, to distinguish it from surface
water which flows overland and in rivers. Both surface and subsurface
water are related through the hydrologic cycle, which is the path taken
by the water on Earth: from oceans to atmosphere by evaporation, from
atmosphere to the ground by precipitation, and ultimately back to the
sea by run-off or streamflow.
At present, groundwater is by far the world's most widespread
source of fresh water. It is available in nearly every part of the globe,
often at depths easily reached by wells. The water supply of most water-
bearing rock formations, or aquifers, is replenished to some extent each
year. Precipitation seeps below the soil to the water table, that is, into the
4
upper surface of an aquifer that is not confined above by an impervious
rock layer.
Of the water withdrawn from streams, lakes, or wells for human use,
nearly two-thirds is used for irrigating crops. Irrigation consumes more
than any other single use. In the United States, an average of 55 percent
of the water used for irrigating crops evaporates or transpires to the
atmosphere in the form of water vapor. This 55 percent is classified as
consumed because it is not returned directly to streams or groundwater
aquifers. Thus, is not available for immediate reuse. In the case of water
withdrawn for personal and many industrial uses, nearly all of it may be
available for reuse, either directly or after suitable treatment.
For a wide variety of uses, groundwater is more desirable than sur-
face water for at least seven reasons: (1) it is commonly free of pathogenic
organisms, and purification for domestic or industrial use is not neces-
sary; (2) its temperature is nearly constant, which is advantageous if the
water is used for heat exchange; (3) it is generally free of turbidity and
color; (4) its chemical composition is usually constant; (5) groundwater
supplies are not seriously affected by short droughts; (6) most of it has
not been affected by radiochemical or biological contamination; and (7) it
is available in many areas that do not have dependable surface-water
supplies because the groundwater has been stored by nature through
many years of recharge.
The total amount of groundwater in the United Stated Is "vast-
about 50 million acre-feet. Even so, the western cities and farms are
pumping it out faster than it can be replenished." [Ref. 4:p. 47] This pro-
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cess is called overdrafting. But "overdrafting is not necessarily bad- any
more than mining coal or pumping oil is bad. But it is essential to under-
stand that some groundwater supplies are irreplaceable." [Ref. 4:p. 471 In
many areas, including California, today's overdrafting is leading to
tomorrow's crisis.
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA
The area selected for study in this thesis is the Salinas Valley, a
portion of the lower basin of the Salinas River. The valley is roughly lin-
ear, tends northward, and generally has a wedge shape. It is 150 miles
long, three miles wide at the upper southeastern end, and approximately
15 miles wide at the lower northwestern end along the Monterey Bay and
the Pacific Ocean. The valley floor slopes at a fairly even gradient from
the south to the north, with an altitude of 540 feet above sea level at
Bradley, 200 feet above sea level at Soledad, 75 feet above sea level at
Salinas, and approximately 10 feet above sea level near Monterey Bay. It
covers an area of 285,000 acres whose boundaries are dictated by the
underlying groundwater aquifer directly related to the Salinas River.
Figure 1.1 shows a map of the study area [Ref. 1:p. 51.
The Salinas River runs through the coastal mountains of central
California and drains an area of about 4,400 square miles. The river
originates near Santa Margarita and flows 120 miles northward to the
Pacific coast at Monterey Bay. The lower 70 miles of the river, from San
Ardo to Monterey Bay, are in the Salinas Valley. The valley is underlain
by permeable, water-bearing alluvium. The alluvium forms a continuous
ground-water basin that constitutes the study area for this investigation.
6
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Mountains rise abruptly along both sides of the valley floor. The
Diablo Range and the Gabilan Range lie along the northeast edge of the
valley, and the Sierra de Salinas and Santa Lucia Range flank the south-
west edge. Ridge altitudes average about 2,500 feet on the northeast side
and 4,000 feet on the southwest side. The mountains on both sides of
the valley decrease to low hills near the coast. The study area lies entirely
within Monterey County.
D. MARKET FORMATION, SUPPLY, AND DEMAND
A market is an abstract concept that encompasses the trading
arrangements of buyers and sellers that underlie the forces of supply and
demand. Therefore, market formation is the creation of the opportunity
to trade. In a market, a resource is allocated and priced by means of the
supply and demand curves for the resource. To describe supply and
demand in the context of groundwater, it is useful to use a model
describing a groundwater aquifer. Table 1.1 [Ref. 1:p. 451 represents a
static model of the Salinas Valley aquifer. In this model, the supply of
water is represented by the inflows into the aquifer and the demand is
represented by the outflows. The mean rates of inflows and outflows are
described in acre-feet per year. The concept of supply and demand in this
context are fundamental to understanding a free market system for
water.
A market is continuous if the bidding process between buyer and
seller continues over time. This bidding and selling process represents
market activity. Market activity is the action of buyers and sellers, while
market formulation is the institutional changes that result from the
8
opportunity to trade. Whenever an established price/quantity relation-
ship no longer represents relative economic values, a continuous market
allows the price/quantity relationship to change [Ref. 6:p. 101.
TABLE 1.1
ESTABLISHED MEAN ANNUAL WATER BUDGET FOR THE
SALINAS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN 1970-81
Rate of Inflow or Outflow
Budget Item Acre-feet/ Percentage
year of total
Inflow
Recharge from the Salinas River 214,300 38.3
Recharge from the Arroyo Seco 93,600 16.7
Recharge from small streams 23,300 4.2
Other ground-water inflow 13,000 2.3
Percolation of irrigation water 190,300 34.0
Recharge from precipitation 6,100 1.1
Seawater intrusion 18,900 3.4
Total inflow 559,500 100.0
Outflow
Agricultural pumpage 512,200 91.5
Municipal pumpage 22,300 4.0
Riparian phreatophyte evapotranspiration* 25,000 4.5
Total outflow 559,500 100.0
"The process of transferring moisture from the earth to the atmosphere by evaporation
and passage of water through a long-rooted plant from the water table or the soil above
It.
The distinction between market formation and market activity is
important in this study because it emphasizes the role of policy in mat-
ters of voluntary behavior. Market activity is voluntary behavior. Policy
can only create the opportunity to trade, that is, policy can form a
9
market, but it cannot make economic actors voluntarily trade. Policy
cannot make market activity. This study focuses on the policy changes
that would be required for the formation of a free market system for agri-
cultural water resources.
E. COMMON POOL RESOURCE
What is common to many is taken least care of, for all men have
greater regard for what is their own than for what they possess in
common with others.
Aristotle
One cause of the inefficient allocation of groundwater resources in
the Salinas Valley lies in the treatment of groundwater aquifers as com-
munal property or "common pool resources." The common-pool problem
occurs when a number of overlying property owners are engaged in com-
petitive pumping of water from a common underlying aquifer. The fun-
damental characteristic of such a situation is that water is no one's
property until and unless captured for use [Ref. 7:pp. 63-661. Each indi-
vidual considers, in his decisions, only the effect of his pumping upon
the water level in his well and not its adverse effects in the wells of his
neighbors.
This phenomenon has initially been studied in the case of ocean
fisheries [Ref. 8:pp. 124-142], where no fisherman takes into considera-
tion the fact that his catch consists partly of fish which would have been
caught by others. This fishery case has an additional dimension in that
the rate of fish replenishment is directly related to the quantity of
remaining fish.
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Because groundwater moves in response to withdrawals, the pump-
ers are interdependent and hence "externalities" 2 are present. When sub-
stantial external effects exist, the calculation of benefits and costs by the
individual pumper fails to reflect the total impact of the pumping on
society, and a social misallocation of the resources results.
The external effects of groundwater withdrawals are called "techno-
logical diseconomies." They are technological because the impact is regis-
tered through a physical link between production processes. They are
diseconomies because the effects impose a cost on users, rather than a
benefit. Under heavy exploitation, groundwater basin management
becomes an issue for communities concerned with detrimental external
effects such as saltwater intrusion, subsidence of the overlying land sur-
face, and increased pumping costs due to lower water levels.
The "communality" of the resource is a manifestation of the "fugitive"
nature of the water resources, namely the lack of direct control. The
"common pool" structure of property rights for groundwater fails to
include all the significant consequences of private decisions. Typically,
the incentives are such that they encourage excessive exploitation. A
decision to conserve for future use does not create a property right, and
the preserved resource is still subject to the law of capture by others.
ý'Ihe side effects of an action that influence the well-being of non-
consenting parties. The nonconsenting parties may be either helped (by
external benefits) or harmed (by external costs).
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F. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Several studies have examined the allocation of water resources.
Most of the studies have examined water markets for surface water
transfers. The studies conclude that a market allocation of surface water
is an efficient way to allocate water resources. The formation of markets
for surface water can be facilitated through institutional changes.
Phelps, Moore, and Graubard [Ref. 9:pp. 14-361 concluded that
water use throughout California is not efficient because, in part, of the
institutional restrictions on water. The current laws in some water dis-
tricts against transferring water outside the district is one example of
these institutional restrictions. The estimated annual social loss due to
transfer restrictions was calculated to be between $60 million and $370
million.
Noel [Ref. 10:pp. 28-521 defined six hydrological basins in Yolo
County and studied the pumping patterns using an optimal control
model. He found that the marginal benefits were not equal among the six
basins in the current non-trade environment. Further, Noel found that if
transfer were permitted, the most water-deficient basin would be willing
to purchase 16,549 acre-feet of water per year from the most water-
abundant basin at a price equal to $16.86 per acre-foot. Noel concluded
that present groundwater use is inefficient and that inter-basin transfer
is a mechanism to improve efficiency in allocation.
Allocation rules which prohibit trade produce greater inefficiencies
as the cost of water development increases [Ref. 1 1:pp. 36-721. Leveen
[Ref. I I:pp. 36-721 found that as the cost of developing additional water
12
supplies increases and the net benefits of newly developed water
decrease, the incentive for market activity involving existing water sup-
plies will increase.
Howitt, Mann, and Vaux [Ref. 12:pp. 105-1161 used an interregional
programming model to examine voluntary transfer of water among five
regions defined in their study. Demand and water cost curves for each
region were considered under three scenarios: (1) existing institutions
and no new water supplies, (2) existing institutions and new water sup-
plies, and (3) existing water supplies with institutional changes to allow
trade between the five regions. By comparing the results from the three
scenarios, the study concluded that the most economical means of
resolving the water scarcity problem in California would be to change
institutional arrangements so as to allow voluntary transfer. More benefit
would accrue by voluntary trade than by additional water development.
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE SALINAS VALLEY
As described in Chapter 1, the Salinas Valley covers an area of
285,000 acres, of which 205,000 acres are currently irrigated cropland.
This cropland comprises some of the United States' finest agricultural
land. This chapter will describe the 285,000-acre area in terms of its cli-
mate, agricultural production, water resources, and water problems.
A. CLIMATE
The Salinas Valley enjoys a mild Mediterranean climate which is
attributed to the valley's proximity to the Pacific Ocean. Agricultural
areas closer to the coast benefit from normally moderate year-round
temperatures: cool, dry summers and mild, rainy winters. Because of the
interaction of maritime influences, mountain barriers, and inland heat-
ing, the inland climate is more complex. The mountains along the coast
tend to hold the marine air away from the interior, which makes solar
heating stronger in the middle and southern parts of the valley. As this
warmer interior air begins to rise, it draws cooler marine air from the
Monterey Bay into the valley. The predominantly west and northwest
wind patterns in the summer months, coupled with the northwest-
southwest orientation of the valley, further facilitate this circulation.
Therefore, the range of temperatures, both daily and yearly, is wider in
the inland area. The length of the frost-free season is more than 350 days
near the coast and 200-250 days further inland in the valley (see Figure
2. 1) [Ref. 13:p. 401.
14
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Figure 2.1I. Average Length of Growing Season in Days
The average annual rainfall is greatest at the north end of the valley
and least in the center. Historically, it has varied from a mean of 18
inches per year near the coast to 10 inches per year in Soledad and King
City. During the 30-year period ending in 1960, the annual precipitation
at Salinas and King City ranged from a low of 5.74 and 3.14 inches,
respectively, to a high of 28.10 and 23.81 inches [Ref. 13:p. 41]. The
Salinas Valley is currently in the fourth year of a drought [Ref. 141. Dur-
ing the drought, precipitation amounts have been low, compounding the
water supply problems in this area.
In summary, although irrigation is a valley-wide cultivation require-
ment, the climate in the northern part of the valley allows for the
15
year-round production of a great variety of vegetable crops. In the south-
ern end of the valley, the somewhat more severe climate tends to make it
easier to grow hardier crops, such as sugar beets and dry beans. 3
B. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Agricultural production is the largest industry in Monterey County,
and Monterey County is the number one vegetable-producing county in
the nation [Ref. 15:p. 21. In 1989, Monterey County's agriculture sales
exceeded the one billion dollar mark and set an all-time high gross value
of $1,205,894,880 [Ref. 16:p. i]. Because of this, issues that affect the
agricultural community also greatly affect the entire Monterey economic
community and the nation as a whole.
The large-scale development of agriculture in the Salinas Valley
started in 1770 with the establishment of the Spanish missions. In 1899,
the world's largest sugar-beet refinery was built near Salinas by Claus
Spreckels; it was in large measure the source of prosperity for the region
[Ref. 17:p. 781. Irrigation systems, which eliminated the threat of devas-
tating drought and permitted the introduction of a variety of vegetables,
became possible because of the development of new turbine pumps after
World War I.
About 80 percent of the floor of the Salinas Valley can be irrigated,
with 65 percent currently being irrigated. Although the vailey covers only
3According to the MonLerey County Agricultural Commission, dry
beans consist of large lima, small white, and other dry beans.
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one-seventh of the county area, it accounts for virtually all the agricul-
tural production of the county. Monterey County, in turn, produces 95
percent of the artichokes, 55 percent of the broccoli, 35 percent of the
cauliflower, 30 percent of the lettuce, and 20 percent of the celery grown
in the U.S. The arreage planted and annual values of major crops in
Monterey are shown in Table 2.1 [Refs. 16, 18. and 191.
TABLE 2.1
MACOR CROPS IN MONTEREY COUNTY
Acres Value ($1,000s)
1987-1989 1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
Lettuce 79.792 80,271 76,898 317,395 302,877 330,901
Broccoli 54,810 49,075 50,960 115,951 114,684 122,098
Cauliflower 23,400 20,160 21,391 76,466 69,520 64,411
Grapes 24,814 26,843 26,720 40.276 44,247 60,139
Strawberries 4,065 5,105 5,050 110,462 134,039 102,474
Artichokes 7.660 7,720 8,360 27.880 28,580 25,686
Celery 6,205 4,449 5,085 38,196 33,674 34,456
Tomatoes 4,920 5,940 7,440 28,251 33,094 29,895
Sugar Beets 4,340 3,220 2,830 5,334 4.882 4,495
Carrots 5,095 5.750 5,351 12,769 16,955 18,110
Onions 907 1,295 1,348 6,727 8,892 8,167
Barley 23,200 27,300 21,300 1,877 3,240 2,150
Peppers 1,310 2,720 2,990 4,417 9,622 10,606
Dry Beans 3.283 3,185 3,053 2,274 3,101 2.525
Alfalfa 5,300 3,050 2,970 3,672 2,238 2,300
Potatoes 1,000 1,200 1,000 2.280 3,120 2,600
Total 250,101 246,083 242,749 794,227 812,765 812,846
In terms of annual dollar value, lettuce is by far the leading crop in
the Salinas Valley and Monterey County, as shown in Figure 2.2 [Refs.
17
18:p. 17: 19:p. 17; and 16:p. 171. The acreage planted in lettuce increased
by 13 percent between 1981 and 1989. Broccoli is the second-largest
crop, with one-third of the lettuce annual dollar value. Currently, broc-
coli acreage is two-thirds of the lettuce acreage, although it has increased
by about 20 percent during the past 10 years. The acreage of cauliflower
has increased at roughly the same rate as lettuce [Ref. 16:p. 24].
Along with many other areas in California, Salinas Valley vineyards
have also become important. Twenty years ago, few vineyards existed in
the valley; now, they are the fifth largest source of revenue in the county
and their acreage is the third largest among irrigated crops [Ref. 16:p.
251. The production of tomatoes and celery is also increasing, although at
a much slower rate. Sugar beets, dry beans, carrots, and potatoes are the
most prominent among those crops which have seen decreasing produc-
tion in the past 20 years [Ref. 2 0:p. 41.
The growing of crops in the Salinas Valley is highly labor intensive.
Field crops and some plots of tomatoes and grapes are all harvested by
hand. Vegetables and fruits are manually picked, sorted, and packed,
which makes the typical harvesting costs at least half of the total produc-
tion costs [Ref. 13:p. 431.
The increasing acreage in irrigated and double-cropped vegetables
(vegetables grown twice in one year) is a major factor in explaining the
overdraft of the underlying groundwater reservoir. A soil survey of Mon-
terey County was conducted in 1978 by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
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Figure 2.2. Value of the Leading Crops In the Salinas
Valley/Monterey County 1987-1989
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irrigation water by crop in the Salinas Valley. Table 2.2 [Ref. 21:p. 9]
shows the results of this survey. The amount of water used to irrigate
crops is also related to irrigation efficiency, 4 which varies between 56
percent in the southern part of the valley and 74 percent in the northern
part [Ref. 2l:p. 71.
TABLE 2.2
WATER CONSUMPTION BY CROPS
Avg Acre-Feet/
Crop Month/Acre of Crop Growing Season
Lettuce 2.5 All year
Broccoli 2 All year
Cauliflower 2.5 All year
Artichokes 1.75 All year
Celery 3.5 All year
Tomatoes 2.75 March-October
Carrots 2.75 All year
Potatoes 2.5 Apr.-November
Sugar Beets 3.5 All year
White Beans 2.5 May-October
Alfalfa 3 All year
Grapes 1.5 March-November
Strawberries 5 All year
4 The amount of water actually needed to grow the plant divided by
the total amount of water applied.
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C. WATER RESOURCES
In Monterey Countyi, 89 percent of the water used, including almost
all of the irrigation water, is pumped directly from an underlyinvg aquifer
called the Salinas Valley Aquifer. Of the 659,400 acre-feet per year of
water currently used in the county, it is estimated that agriculture con-
sumes 90.5 percent [Ref. 15:p. 2]. Recharging of this aquifer is mainly
accomplished through the percolation of water from the Salinas River.
This river supplies a natural underground water storage and distribution
system for Salinas Valley farmers. Maximizing the yield of groundwater
from percolated surface water requires that surface water be controlled
so that it flows above the aquifer at a rate as close as possible to the
percolation rate.
In 1946, the State Department of Water Resources subdivided the
valley floor into four hydrologically interconnected units: Upper Valley,
Forebay, East-Side, and Pressure (see Figure 2.3) [Ref. 1:p. 6-7]. The
following sections give a brief description of each area [Refs. 22 and 23:p.
2-31.
1. Upper Valley Area
The Upper Valley Area consists of the southern end of the valley
and has a gross area of 85,000 acres. It extends from about six miles
north of Bradley to about 7.5 miles north of King City. Major urban areas
are San Ardo, San Lucas, and King City. In this area, the Sargent, Pine,
San Lorenzo, and Pancho Rico Creeks are tributaries to the Salinas
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San Antonio Rivers, which originate in the Santa Lucia Mountains, join
the Salinas River less than two miles south of Bradley. The area's uncon-
fined aquifers are recharged by natural percolation from the Salinas
River, the above-mentioned local streams, and precipitation. In addition,
releases from two reservoirs, the Nacimiento and San Antonio, are an
important sou, ce of recharge to the Upper Valley Area.
2. Forebay Area
The Forebay Area extends from the northern boundary of the
Upper Valley Area to the vicinity of the city of Gonzales and consists of
approximately 77,000 acres. The major urban areas within the Forebay
area are Greenfield and Soledad. The only tributaries of significance to
the Salinas River in this area are Chalone Creek, which enters from the
east, and the Arroyo Seco river, which enters from the west. Included in
this area is the Arroyo Seco Cone, a highly permeable alluvial sub-area
south of Soledad and west of the Salinas River. It is generally the area
formed by the fan of Arroyo Seco River and Reliz Creek, both of which
originate in the Santa Lucia Mountains. Infiltration from the Arroyo Seco
River also recharges the unconfined Forebay aquifers. In addition, the
aquifer in the Forebay area is recharged by seepage from natural and
regulated flows of the Salinas River, local streams, agricultural return
flows, and precipitation.
3. East-Side Area
The East-Side Area extends over 43,000 acres, north from Gon-
zales to about three miles east of Castroville, and lies generally east of
Highway 101. Major urban areas in this area are Santa Rita and the
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eastern suburbs of the City of Salinas. Tributaries to the Salinas River in
this area are the Chualar, Quail, Alisal, Natividad, and Gabilan Creeks,
all of which originate in the Gabilan Mountains. The aquifer also receives
recharge by groundwater inflow from the Forebay and Pressure areas and
by irrigation return flows. However, the groundwater flow from the Fore-
bay is limited due to a reduction in transmissivity at the southern edge of
the area.
4. Pressure Area
The Pressure Area extends over 81,100 acres along the western
and central portion of the valley, from Gonzales north to the Monterey
Bay, and lies west of Highway 101. Major urban areas are Gonzales,
Chualar, Salinas, and Castroville. The only major tributary to the Salinas
River in this area is El Toro Creek, which originates in the Santa Lucia
Mountains. This area's alluvium is characterized by two quasi-
continuous clay layers that divide the upper part of the groundwater
basin into three horizontal layers and prevent replenishment of the lower
layers by deep percolation from above. The three layers of aquifer that
are separated by the clay layers have been designated the "180-foot
aquifer," the "400-foot aquifer," and the "900-foot aquifer." See Figure 2.4
[Ref. 221 for a visual description of these aquifer layers. The numbers
refer to the average depth to water-bearing strata. The pressure area is
now primarily recharged by inflow from the Forebay and from seawater
intrusion. The East-Side Area appears to have been one of the natural
sources of recharge for the Pressure area, but overdrafting of that area













For several decades, water demand in Monterey County has
exceeded the supply, resulting in groundwater overdraft, seawater
intrusion, shortages during dry years, and increased water costs. In
addition, the municipal and industrial water demand is increasing
as the population within the county increases. [Ref. 23:p. 2-1]
Groundwater is essentially the only source of water supply for all
Salinas Valley users: municipal, industrial and agricultural. Although the
total demand for water has increased continually in the past, the share of
irrigation pumping has remained equal to approximately 90 percent of
this demand. The water problem in Monterey County is principally linked
to the increasing acreage planted with vegetables. Not only do these
crops require a large irrigation application during their growing cycle, but
their shorter growing cycle also promotes double-cropping.
E. GROUNDWATER OVERDRAFT AND SALT WATER INTRUSION
According to the United States Department of Agriculture, Soil
Conservation Service, growers of the Salinas Valley pumped more than
593.460 acre-feet of water from the ground in 1989 [Ref. 15:p. 21. This is
about 36,500 acre- feet more than the estimated mean annual recharge
amount and is known as overdrafting. Overdraftlng of our underground
water supply has resulted in coastal farmers having to pump water from
greater depths and in seawater intrusion along the coast. While this over-
drafting cannot continue indefinitely, new sources of water are expensive
and hard to find.
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Using yearly changes in groundwater levels, the Monterey County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District5 estimated the change in
the amount of water stored in the aquifer for the 1961-1976 period by
multiplying the acreage of each unconfined aquifer area by the estimated
specific yield [Ref. 13:p. 571. Assuming an additional deficit of 16,500
acre-feet because of the increase of irrigated acreage, overdraft estimates




Upper Valley 913 acre-feet annually
Forebay 6,570 acre-feet annually
East-Side 11,680 acre-feet annually
Pressure 17,337 acre-feet annually
36,500
Salt-water intrusion is a common problem in groundwater forma-
tions located near the coast [Ref. 24:p. 251. It is defined as an increase in
the salinity of groundwater over what normally occurs at a given location
in the aquifer. This problem is well known along the border between the
Salinas Valley and the Pacific Ocean. The salt water threat has been
generally recognized since the 1940's and studied intensively since
1983." [Ref. 25:p. 41. 'By 1944 the pumping overdraft had resulted in
5The Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dis-
trict will change its name to the Monterey County Water Resource
Agency, effective 1 January 1991.
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salt-water contamination in some wells near the coast." [Ref. 24:p. 1071
Seawater is now advancing into the aquifer at a rate which is resulting in
".an annual loss of 570 acres of irrigated farm land in the Castrovile area.
Local officials say that the advancing salt water could reach Salinas
within the next 15 years." [Ref. 25:p. 11
Salt-water intrusion makes it necessary to drill deeper and more
expensive wells and causes uncertainty about the future availability of
water. It also has reduced agricultural land values in the northern part of
the valley. Permanent relief requires overcoming the overdraft and restor-
ing the seaward groundwater slope. To date, most projects that have
been considered to solve this problem have been abandoned due to
excessive costs [Ref. 221.
F. GROUNDWATER LEVEL
Like most of the aquifers that have been exploited in the western
states, water levels have been declining in the Salinas Valley Aquifer.
In the Upper Valley Area, the water table dropped from 1944
through the late 1950's, then returned to 1944 levels after the con-
struction of the Nacimiento and San Antonio reservoirs. It has
remained at virtually the same level since.
The Forebay Area groundwater levels have shown approximately
the same patterns as the Upper Valley basin except that, since 1967,
they have declined slightly.
The decline in groundwater levels on the East-Side Area has
exceeded 40 feet since 1944. Although the variations of storage level
are bigger than in the two upstream sub-basins, the water table has
been, on average, declining continuously at high rate since the
1960's.
The Pressure Area basin is confined and the piezometric surface
has fallen by 25 feet. This is a .5 percent annual average decrease
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and has resulted in an intrusion of seawater from Monterey Bay.
[Ref. 13:p. 57]
The extent of the intrusion into both the 180- and 400-foot aquifers is
indicated in Figure 2.5 [Ref. 22]. Note that this is the extent of the salt-
water intrusion as of 1985. In the Castroville area, a significant number
of wells are currently not usable because of the high salinity of the water
pumped. In the past, the East-Side Area has been one of the natural
sources of recharge for the Pressure area, but overdrafting of that area
has stopped this from happening.
G. PROJECTED DEMANDS AND FUTURE SHORTAGES
Water demand for the Salinas Valley has been estimated by the
Corps of Engineers for the years 1990 and 2010 [Ref. 23:p. 3-21. The total
water demand has been broken into two components: municipal/
industrial and agricultural. The estimates of these two components are
described below.
Estimated municipal water demands for the Salinas Valley have
been developed based on Association of Monterey Bay Area Govern-
ments (AMBAG) population projections, estimates provided by the
Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
municipal demand estimates for Marina and Fort Ord by the Sea-
water Intrusion Committee (December 1988), population estimates
by the U.S. Bureau of Census (1971), and a survey of water use con-
ducted by the District in cooperation with the County Planning
Department (1984). [Ref. 23:p. 3-21
Estimated population, and municipal, and industrial water demand for
the years 1990 and 2010 are shown in Table 2.4 [Ref. 23:p. 3-31.
The total annual estimated agricultural irrigation water demand for








ESTIMATED MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL WATER DEMANDS
YEARS 1990 AND 2010
Use Per Year 1990 Year 2010
Community Capita Population Demand Population Demand
(gal/day) (acre-feet/year) (acre-feet/year)
Splinas 150 102.627 17,24) 145,000 24,359
Castroville 175 5.177 1,015 6.650 1,303
Greenfield 133 7.290 1,086 8.510 1,268
Gonzales 154 5,180 893 6,175 1,065
King City 165 8,581 1,586 15,700 2,901
Soledad 99 8,090 897 9,750 1.081
Marina N/A 21,012 3.800 37,879 6.400
Fort Ord N/A 30,460 8,200 32,124 8,200
San Ardo 215 460 111 550 132
Spreckels 201 670 151 800 180
Chualar 150 580 97 700 11l
San Lucas 148 202 33 240 40
Unincorporated 140 30.551 4,790 42.122 6,605
Yndustrial 2,305 2,305
220,880 42,204 306,200 55,957
irrigated acreage by the estimated average annual per acre water require-
ment. The estimated irrigation water demands for the years 1990 and
2110 are shown in Table 2.5 [Ref. 23:p. 3-61.
The average annual per acre water demand, irrigated acreage and
total annual applied water demands for the Salinas Valley subarea, as
set forth in Table 2-5, were estimated by Boyle Engineering in connection
with the Salinas Valley Seawater Intrusion Program. Although the poten-
tial exists for additional agricultural lands to be developed, particularly in
the upper Valley, no increase in irrigation water demands has been pro-
jected for the year 2010. This assumes that any increase in water use
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attributable to the addition of new agricultural lands will be offset by
lands being taken out of production for urban use and improved irriga-
tion efficiency [Ref. 23: p. ,-5].
TABLE 2.5
ESTIMATED AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION WATER DEMANDS
YEARS 1990 AND 2010
Annual Unit
Applied Year 1990 Year 2010
Demand Irrigated Demand Irrigated Demand
Subarea (AF/yeazi Acreage (AF/yea4 Acreage (AF/year)
Salinas Valley [2.5 205,000 511,000 205,000 511,000
The Salinas Valley groundwater model was recently used to estimate
groundwater balances for the various units of the Salinas Valley Ground-
water Basin. The analysis used 1951 through 1985 hydrological data and
forecast water demands from 1986 through 2020. The computer model
output included estimates of seawater intrusion and the losses in
groundwater storage, which in combination established the need for sup-
plemental water. The analysis was adjusted to develop the 1990 and
2010 supplemental water demands set forth in Table 2.6 [Ref. 23:p.3-81.
H. SUMMARY
Groundwater in the Salinas Valley Aquifer is recharged primarily
from the Salinas River through natural streams and controlled releases.
Because the volume of water in the Salinas River decreases as it moves
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TABLE 2.6
SUMMARY OF WATER DEMANDS
Safe Yield Suppl.
Irrigated Total Water Demands Existing Water
Subarea Population Acreage M & I* Irrigation Total Sources Demand
(1.000 AFM1 (1.000 AF (1,000 AM (1,000 AF) (1.000 AF
Year 1990 Estimates
Salinas Valley 220.990 205,000 42.20 511.00 553.2 515.30 37.90
Year 2010 Estimates
Salinas Valley 306,200 205,000 56.00 511.00 567.00 518.80 48.20
*Municipal and Industrial
toward the coast, the Upper Valley and Forebay areas have a smaller loss
of groundwater storage than the downstream areas. But, because of soil
and climate characteristics, the downstream areas possess a comparative
advantage in growing vegetables year-round. The combination of more
intensive agriculture and less recharge induces an overdraft in the Pres-
sure and East-Side areas, which subsequently leads not only to the
destruction of the aquifer by seawater intrusion but also to a dramatic
increase in pumping costs.
To a lesser degree, the growth of urban and industrial centers
located in the northern part of the county contributes to the increasing
overdraft. The district is currently debating a surface-water development
project involving a new dam on the Arroyo Seco, which may indicate that
major problems confronting the district involve water transfers within the
valley. The Arroyo Seco project would provide additional recharge to the
northern part of the Forebay, the Pressure, and the East-Side areas. In
part, this would result from the increased natural percolation of the
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Salinas River north of Greenfield. Two river diversions (pumping plants
and pipelines) that direct water toward the critical areas of Castroville
and East Side would contribute to the recharge of the Pressure and East-
Side Areas as well. The water supply of both sub-areas would be com-
plemented by surface-water delivery networks.
Though it has not yet been decided what course of action will best
reduce or eliminate the water problems facing the Salinas Valley, it is
certain that any solution involving the construction of water distribution
or storage facilities will be tremendously expensive. To do nothing to ease
the water crisis, however, would be even more costly to the county, as
well as the nation, because of the consequent effects upon vegetable
production.
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MI. PRIVATIZATION OF GROUNDWATER
A. GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE SALINAS VALLEY
Centralized management of groundwater by various levels of govern-
ment has been the dominant policy tool to manage groundwater in the
state of California [Ref. 26:p. 76]. The Monterey County Flood Control
and Water Conservation District is the central agency for groundwater
basin management in the Salinas Valley. Recently, this agency has
begun to take on a greater role in the management of groundwater in the
Salinas Valley. Centralized management has taken the form of a county-
wide water resource management plan that is currently being formulated
by members of the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conserva-
tion District 6 In this plan, many new water resource projects are being
considered. While it is true that water supplies are scarce and ultimately
finite, and that demand has been increasing rapidly, it does not follow
that centralized regulation is necessary. This thesis will show that the
real issue is whether the agencies responsible for water management pro-
vide signals and incentives that correctly reflect the scarcity of water,
allowing resource users to respond to changes in supply and/or demand.
The Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
was formed in 1947 by a special act of the California state legislature. Its
territory includes all of Monterey County, but specific zones can be cre-
6 Hereinafter referred to as the "District."
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ated by the District within the county for various local projects and for
the purposes of both assessment and the issuance of bonds. Figure 3.1
[Ref. 22] shows the location of the existing zones in the county. The gov-
erning body of the District is the Monterey County Board of Supervisors,
and voting privileges for bonded indebtedness are attributed to the regis-
tered voters in the affected zone. The District has the authority to issue
general obligation bonds, allowing the voters in the affected areas to sig-
nify approval with a majority vote.
The general administrative costs of the District that accrue to the
entire county are financed by annual ad valorem assessments upon all
properties in the entire county. Water projects established for the benefit
of a specific zone, however, are financed by annual ad valorem assess-
ments in the zone benefited. The assessments are based on the number
of acres owned rather than on water use.
The Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dis-
trict's primary method for managing the Salinas Valley aquifer is through
the controlled release of water from two reservoirs, the Nacimiento and
the San Antonio reservoirs. Revenues for this operation are raised by
levying an assessment on land owners who receive the most benefit from
these releases. These land owners are located closest to the Salinas River
and the areas they are located in are designated zones 2 and 2A of the
Salinas Valley.
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Figure 3. 1. Zones of The Monterey County Flood Control
and Water Conservation District
B. OPERATION OF THE NACIMIENTO AND SAN ANTONIO
RESERVOIRS
In 1954, the District appropriated the unappropriated water of the
Nacimlento River for the "Joint and common benefit of all users without
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recognition for separate rights for different uses either in the amount of
use or the priority right," [Ref. 27:p. 31. In 1956, they built the Nacimi-
ento dam. Considerable pride in the Salinas Valley is attached to the fact
that the project was completely financed with local funds through a
$7 million bond issue, approved by the voters in the Salinas Valley in
April 1955 by a margin of 11 to one.
In 1963, a $12.9 million bond issue for the construction of a dam on
the nearby San Antonio River was approved. The bond is being repaid by
property taxes in the area of the Salinas Valley defined as zone 2A- this
zone encompasses a major portion of the valley floor that can be irri-
gated, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
provides recharge of the Salinas Valley aquifer by releasing water from
the Nacimiento and San Antonio reservoirs into the Salinas River. This
allows water to percolate into the aquifer through the river bed. These
reservoirs have a capacity of 350,000 acre-feet each. The dams are oper-
ated for the benefit of the property owners in Zones 2 and 2A of the
Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Figure
3.1). These benefits include flood control, water conservation, and
recreation.
During the winter months, when heavy rains can cause flooding in
the Salinas Valley, the dams provide flood protection by controlling two of
the three largest tributaries of the Salinas River. Space for flood storage
is kept in both reservoirs. This space is designated as the conservation
pool. The size of the conservation pool is indicated by the number of feet
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from the base of the reservoir to the spillway lip. The conservation pool
for the San Antonio Reservoir is 771 feet and the conservation pool for
Nacimiento Reservoir is 767 feet. The District releases a certain amount
of water during the winter months if the reservoirs fill up too much. As
spring approaches, the chance of a large flood diminishes. Then the
amount of flood storage needed decreases and the reservoirs are allowed
to fill up to the conservation pool level, if there is enough precipitation.
The amount of flood storage needed in the winter is determined by
the amount of water that flows into the reservoirs. The average annual
flow into Lake Nacimiento is 190,000 acre-feet, while 67,000 acre-feet
flow into lake San Antonio [Ref. 221. Therefore, Lake Nacimiento receives
approximately three times the inflow of San Antonio Lake. Releases from
the conservation storage are made at a three-to-one ratio, Nacimiento
releasing three times as much water as San Antonio. The outlet pipe for
Nacimlento is smaller than the outlet pipe for San Antonio, so Nacimi-
ento cannot release large amounts of water as quickly as San Antonio
can. This reduces the District's flexibility to release water from Nacimi-
ento and necessitates a fairly constant release in order to maintain Naci-
miento's conservation pool.
Replenishment of the Salinas Valley groundwater basin is another
primary benefit derived from the operation of the Nacimiento and San
Antonio dams. During the late spring, summer, and early fall, the Salinas
River would normally be dry. During these seasons, the District releases
water from both dams to keep the Salinas River flowing and recharge the
aquifer without wasting water to the ocean. Water is released into the
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Salinas River and is allowed to flow to a point Just north of Spreckels.
Spreckels lies above the edge of a heavy, impermeable buried clay layer.
Water released from the reservoirs which flows above this clay layer can-
not percolate into the aquifer through the layer. Therefore, the District
regulates releases so that flows stop north of Spreckels to maximize the
amount of water that percolates into the aquifer. Percolation rates vary
throughout the year between 250 to 600 cubic feet per second. Evapora-
tion and transpiration loss is estimated between 27 and 41 cubic feet per
second [Ref. 22].
The amount of water released from both reservoirs is determined by
the amount needed to replenish the groundwater supply and the amount
available for release. The Nacimiento Reservoir maintains a minimum
pool of 670 feet and the San Antonio Reservoir maintains a minimum
pool of 662 feet. The minimum pool is set to a value greater than zero for
environmental reasons (e.g., to keep the aquatic life alive). When water is
below the minimum pool level, no water is released. The appendix con-
tains graphs of the reservoir levels at the end of each month from 1957 to
April of 1990. Current reservoir levels are below the minimum level
required before water can be released.
There has been a steady drop in the water available to release from
1986 to the present (accounting for seasonal changes). This steady drop
has complicated the central control model by limiting the amount of
water and number of releases the District can perform.
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C. WATER STANDBY/AVAILABILITY CHARGES
The Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
receives revenue for the support of the Nacimiento and San Antonio
dams through standby (sometimes called availability) charges levied on
land owners in zones 2 and 2A. These standby charges are currently
limited by district ordinances to no more than $10 per acre or per parcel
smaller than an acre. A recent proposal to change the Monterey County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District Conservation Act would
increase the maximum standby charge to $25 per acre [Ref. 28:p. A41.
Standby charges are assessed on the property tax bill at the rates
described in Table 3.1. The rates charged are based on the type of land
use rather than on any consumptive use. This is an important distinction
when evaluating the effectiveness of the current centralized management
system. The rates levied on land owners merely provide revenue to the
District to maintain reservoirs, collect data, and pay for support staff.
These rates do not alter consumer behavior because they provide no eco-
nomic incentive to the users to reduce consumption. The rates affect the
users' fixed costs and total cost but not their variable costs. Figure 3.2
describes consumer behavior in this situation.
Assuming landowners are maximizing their profits, they want to
produce where total revenue exceeds total cost by the greatest possible
amount. Total cost and total revenue are shown graphically in Figure 3.2.
The difference between total cost and revenue is maximized when the two
curves are parallel, as shown in Figure 3.2 at output level Q1. To
maximize profits, producers also want to select combinations of inputs
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TABLE 3.1
WATER STANDBY OR AVAABILITY CHARGES 1989-90, 1990-91
Land Use Zone 2 Zone 2A
Factors 1989-90 1990-91 1989-90 [ 1990-91
A .72/acre 1.10/acre 2.40/acre 8.90/acre
B 1.44/acre 1. 10/acre 4.80/acre 8.90/acre
C .06/acre .12/acre .22/acre .88/acre
D .02/acre .02/acre .02/acre .10/acre
Factor A = Irrigated agricultural, residential, commercial, and institutional land
Factor B = Industrial land
Factor C = Dry farm, grazing, and vacant land
Factor D = River channels and land subject to frequent flooding
1"--Tatal Cost (TyC)
"-Total Revenue
.- Total Cost (Tc3)
Variable Cost
Output Level of Vegetables
Figure 3.2. Effect of Standby Charges on Consumer Behavior
that minimize the cost of producing this level of output. The isoquants in
Figure 3.3 show the possible combination of variable inputs (in this case
water and fertilizer) capable of producing a fixed output. The isocost line
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shows the different combinations of inputs that have the same total cost
(i.e., the slope of this line equals the price of water divided by the price of
fertilizer). Total costs increase as new isocost lines shift out from the ori-
gin. Thus, the cost-minimizing combination of inputs occurs where the









Figure 3.3. Isoquants For Vegetable Output
A standby charge levied on owners causes the total cost curve to
shift from TCO to TCI in Figure 3.2 but the optimal quantity Q1 does not
change because these two total cost curves are parallel. 7 The distance
between the total cost and the total revenue curve decreases when
7 The optimal remains the same with one exception. The optimal
quantity changes to zero when the standby charge is great enough to
place the total cost curve completely above the entire revenue curve.
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standby charges are applied, representing a reduction in profits when
fixed costs increase. The combination of variable costs represented by the
isoquants does not change because neither the level of output nor the
relative price of the inputs has changed. Therefore, the units of water
used with an increase in fixed costs do not change. Thus, the standby
charge does not provide an economic incentive for farmers to reduce the
consumption of water.
Intuitively, this makes sense. Producers select the combination of
variable inputs so as to maximize the difference between total revenues
and operating costs. This maximizes net operating revenues, with which
fixed costs must be paid. Any revenues remaining after paying fixed costs
represent the producer's profits. An increase in fixed costs will reduce
profits but will not affect the combination of variable inputs that maxi-
mizes the difference between total revenues and operating costs. Thus,
changes in fixed costs will not affect water usage.
Under a central control model, a more economically efficient assess-
ment would be a replenishment assessment or groundwater charge. A
replenishment assessment or groundwater charge is a charge levied on
water users who extract groundwater, both retail water purveyors and
individual water users, and is based on annual water use. This charge
would change the slope of the total cost curve and the isocost line, lead-
ing to a smaller output and less water intensive production process.
Such a charge ultimately requires that meters be installed on all wells,
public and private, and that the amount of water pumped from each well
be reported to the District.
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A replenishment assessment can be an important charge as part of
an overall water basin management approach. Varying the magnitude of
replenishment assessment helps to influence the variable cost, and
theýrefore the use of groundwater relative to water from other sources.
Neither the District nor the county has the power to establish a
replenishment assessment, and no such power is included in the amend-
ments to the District Act that were proposed in 1990.
D. PRIVATIZING THE SALINAS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASINS
The majority of the initial research on groundwater allocation
focused on the development of optimal control techniques for maximizing
the net present value of the resource [Ref. 29:pp. 33-34]. Recognizing the
practical difficulties of implementing optimal control models, the hesi-
tance of most groundwater regulatory agencies to use incentive-oriented
management techniques that affect consumer behavior and therefore the
supply and demand for water resources, and other problems inherent to
bureaucratic control, has spurred interest in creating private property
rights for groundwater. Establishing groundwater rights is fundamental
to creating a market system for agricultural water resources because it
establishes a commodity that can be defined, valued, and traded.
E. GROUNDWATER RIGHTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As long as groundwater was relatively abundant, it made little sense
for the early American settlers to devote much effort to devising
institutions to govern its allocation. As with many of our property institu-
tions, the simplest rules were adopted from those of England. The
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English rule of absolute ownership first used to establish property rights
in water gave the overlying landowners complete freedom to allocate
groundwater without liability. Since the early English courts knew little
about the hydrology of groundwater, they avoided the issue of classifying
groundwater as property in the same sense as rocks and minerals on or
under an individual's land. "It was in the light of this scientific and judi-
cial ignorance that the overlaying land owner was given total dominion
over his 'property,' that is, a free hand to do as he pleased with the water
found within his land, without accountability for damage." [Ref. 30:p.
272] This form of property rights worked well as long as third-party
injuries were rare- that is, as long as groundwater was not scarce. [Ref.
31:p. 225]
1. Reasonable Use Doctrine
As the demand for water grew and individuals began to compete
for water and land use, the English rule of absolute ownership had to be
modified. The United States courts softened the English rule with the
American rule of reasonable use. Under this law, overlaying landowners
had coequal rights to the groundwater, subject to reasonableness. The
judicial determination of reasonableness is related to the demand of
adjacent landowners on the common supply. This aspect of the reason-
able-use doctrine can create uncertainty in the long run. The determina-
tion of reasonableness is subject to the whim of the court and can
change with various economic and social conditions. As water has
become more scarce, uncertainty has increased as more uses have been
successfully challenged as unreasonable. [Ref. 31:p. 2271
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2. Correlative Rights Doctrine
The common-law rule of absolute ownership and reasonable use
of groundwater was rejected for California in 1903 and replaced with the
correlative rights doctrine. The correlative rights doctrine differs from the
reasonable use doctrine in two basic respects. First, in the event that the
demand for groundwater exceeds the supply, then all overlaying land
owners must reduce their use on a coequal basis. Second, in cases where
supplies are in excess of the reasonable needs of overlaying landowners,
then water may be put to use in areas that don't overlay the aquifer
itself. [Ref. 31:p. 228]
3. Current Water Rights Doctrines
In general, the water doctrines that exist today have evolved as
a result of the changes in benefits and costs of defining and enforcing
property rights. There are three predominant methods for allocating
groundwater today. The arid western states fclow the appropriation doc-
trine8 (except for California, which uses the correlative doctrine). The
more humid eastern states, with their higher annual precipitation,
allocate groundwater according to the reasonable use doctrine. [Ref.
31:p. 228]
While the increasing relative scarcity of groundwater has
brought pressure for the establishment and revision of groundwater
8 The fundamental principle of the water right under the appropri-
ation doctrine is expressed in the phrase "First in time-first in right."
The rights of water users depending on a common source of supply are
not equal but are ranked in a hierarchy established by the date at which
the uses were first initiated.
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rights, this pressure has not resulted in an efficient institutional arrange-
ment, that is, a set of property rights that gives users the market incen-
tives to put groundwater resources to their highest valued use. For this
to happen, property rightz must be well defined, enforced, and transfera-
ble. Definition and enforcement are necessary to give individuals the
incentive to use water efficiently. In order for exchange of water rights to
take place, traders must have some idea of what rights are included. Less
will be paid for rights not well defined and enforced, and in the extreme
no trade will occur. [Ref. 31:p. 229]
Consider the impact of one person's pumping groundwater on
another's pumping cost. If the rights being purchased cannot be exer-
cised at the original pumping costs (that is, those pumping costs before
the sale), the buyer will have an incentive to pump more water in the
short term. If water rights are defined as a fixed quantity of water, the
buyer of water rights will want to pump more water in the near term,
where his pumping costs are known and these costs are reflected in the
price of the water he has purchased. If the buyer of the water rights waits
to pump the water he has Just purchased, his pumping cost may
increase because of the activities of pumpers around him. This increased
cost was not reflected in the original purchase price of the water rights.
Without property definition and enforcement, pumpers have this
incentive, which can promote excessive depletion of the groundwater
basin. [Ref. 31:p. 230]
The transferability of property rights ensures that individuals
will take into account the opportunity costs of their actions. As long as
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individuals are free to buy and sell water rights, market prices will
emerge, making owners aware of the cost of wasting water. If rights are
not transferable, the fact that water has more valuable alternatives (that
is, water has different marginal values for different uses) makes little dif-
ference; the owner will not be able to sell his water to those who have the
higher valued uses. [Ref. 3 l:p. 232]
The public institutions that have evolved to govern ground-
water, like the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District, have typically defined groundwater rights in ways that are defi-
cient both in terms of certainty and transferability. The groundwater
rights in the Salinas Valley are not tradable, although they do run with
the land and the land can be traded. Therefore, the only way to reflect
the value of water rights is through the price of the overlaying land. Since
the value of a parcel of land has other considerations besides water
rights, the purchase price of the land does not purely reflect the value of
the water rights to which the land owner would be entitled.
4. Mutual Prescription Doctrine
In some instances, California has been evolving toward provid-
ing public institutions the power to establish groundwater property
rights. The California State Supreme Court ruled (1972) in favor of the
mutual prescription doctrine. Under this doctrine, a basin is to be
adjudicated 9 and a safe level of extraction deterrmned. A share of the
9Adjudication of the aquifer means that the courts will decide on a
legal and safe level to which water can be extracted. Pumpers will be
forced to adhere to the level of pumping that will result in this level.
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rights is then allocated to each of the groundwater users in the basin on
the basis of their known or estimated extraction, prior to adjudication.
Since such a system eliminates a part of the common pool problem,
provides an institution for reducing tenure uncertainty, and (by defining
ownership) allows for the possibility of transferring water rights. The
mutual prescription doctrine is currently being applied to the Tehachapi
basin. The Tehachapi basin is located in Kern County approximately 35
miles southeast of Bakersfield, California, and 100 miles north of Los
Angeles. The mutual prescription doctrine was adopted in Kern County
in 1971 as a result of a severe overdraft problem. [Ref. 31: pp. 242-243]
5. Riparian Rights
Riparian rights apply to surface water and do not transfer well
to groundwater. Riparian rights define the water rights o. landowners
adjacent to streams, rivers, or other sources of surface water. All owners
of riparian lands have a legal right to a certain use of water in the
stream, while non-riparian land owners generally have no water rights.
No riparian rights exist for the Salinas or the Arroyo Seco River. Riparian
rights establish a rule of capture, so that the absolute or reasonable use
doctrine does not apply to overlying landowners.
There are subtle relationships between surface water and
groundwater. Some surface-water flows are controlled so as to replenish
groundwater. Generally, this benefits surface-water users by making
water available more consistently over time. However, if groundwater lev-
els have been pumped down, the surface-water flows can percolate into
the groundwater faster, potentially reducing the amount of water
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reaching downstream surface-water users. An example of this is the
Carmel River today.
Finally, if groundwater levels are pumped down and drought
conditions occur, the vegetation along the surface-water channel can die.
Besides the obvious negative aesthetic effect, this can harm those holding
riparian rights by:
a. Damaging floodplain agricultural activities.
b. Allowing increases in future channel erosion, which can destroy
adjoining structures.
c. Reducing the volume of flood water that can be retained by the
channel, thus increasing the risk of flood damage.
Under California's current correlative rights doctrine, landown-
ers have little or no incentive to conserve. If they do not pump the water,
someone else will. The cost of water is a function of the pumping cost
and pumpers clearly anticipate that pumping cost will increase in the
future. Clearly the potential exists for altering the property rights that
govern groundwater allocation to make them more efficient.
F. A MODEL FOR GROUNDWATER USE
Anderson [Ref. 31:pp. 229-2301 describes a simplified model of a
groundwater basin. The basin is much like a tub filled with saturated
coarse sand; a stream of water is flowing in (net natural recharge) and
water is being pumped out from the porous medium in the tub. A static
model describing the recharge and outflow of water in the Salinas Valley
aquifer was developed by Yates [Ref. 1:pp. 6-23). Table 1.1 in Chapter 1
describes the output of this model. The Salinas Valley groundwater basin
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is a single unit without divisions, so this model will be used to describe
conditions in the Salinas Valley. If the incoming flow matches the pump-
ing, the level of saturation of the sand is stable. Otherwise, the level will
rise or fall as the difference between recharge and pumping is positive or
negative. The natural recharge to the aquifer is a random variable, and
as a practical matter the amount of water being pumped is a random
variable reflecting variations in irrigation demand caused by fluctuations
in seasonal precipitation and temperature.
Three variables determine the economic value and allocation of
groundwater over time, the annual rate of pumping, the total stock of
groundwater at the beginning of the year, and the amount of recharge
each year. The annual rate of pumping determines the amount of water
used per year in production. The annual pumping rate in the Salinas
Valley in 1989 was estimated to be 659,400 acre-feet per year, 90 percent
of which (593,460 acre-feet) was consumed by agriculture [Ref. 15:p. 21.
Total recharge in the aquifer was estimated to be 622,900 acre-feet,
resulting in an overdraft of 36,500 acre-feet.
Anderson [Ref. 31:pp. 229-2311 defined the role of stocks as twofold.
Their most direct and fundamental role is to provide the physical basis
for water to be used in production, particularly when water supplies fluc-
tuate rapidly. Their second role is related to pumping costs; higher
stocks imply lower pumping costs because there is less of a lift require-
ment. This implies users would place a future value on the stocks left in
the aquifer which is equal to the present value of the stocks currently
being used for production.
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While an important part of the stock value of groundwater is related
to pumping costs, Anderson [Ref. 31 :p. 2341 describes two other sources
of value. First, because they are bowl-shaped, most aquifers lose part of
their spatial distribution function as stocks decline. As the surface area
of the aquifer water table decreases, the land surface area overlaying
groundwater is reduced. Wells on the old perimeter before stocks were
depleted go dry, and water has to be transported from elsewhere to the
land lying near the old perimeter. In coastal areas like the Salinas Valley,
saltwater intrusion can occur as stocks decline. For example, in parts of
the Salinas Valley adjacent to the ocean, saltwater has intruded up to
five miles inland in the aquifer, beneath nearly 13,000 acres of land [Ref.
15:p. 21.
Further loss of efficiency is encountered whenever the cone of
depression created around the pump intersects the edge or bottom of the
aquifer, because pumping capacity is reduced as stocks are drawn down.
This problem is especially critical for irrigated agriculture, where timing
of water delivery is extremely important. Since the intercessional storage
and spatial distribution functions of the aquifer can be adversely affected
as draw-down occurs, stocks have a value in addition to their direct
impact on pumping costs. [Ref. 3 l:p. 2341
Second, when recharge and irrigation demand are a random vari-
able, stocks have a contingency or insurance value. Shortages of water
can cause a reduction in production to a point where water has a rela-
tively high marginal value, creating a large opportunity value for stored
water. A direct relationship exists between marginal value of stocks and
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the variability of the net additions to stocks in an aquifer. This variability
has more impact on the marginal value of stocks at low rather than high
levels. When stock and flow rights are clearly defined, the insurance
value of groundwater stocks will allow individuals to place a future value
on water remaining in the aquifer. This means that future water will
probably be available for individual use. Therefore, overdraft is less likely
to occur because individuals will want to preserve their right to use stock
in the future. [Ref. 3 1:p. 2341
G. FULL STOCK-FLOW RIGHTS
The most fully defined property rights in groundwater would estab-
lish full stock and flow rights [Ref. 32:pp. 7-10]. The estimated stock of
the water in the aquifer would be allocated as a once-and-for-all property
right that could be exercised at any time. The amount of groundwater
flow rights would be allocated each year based on a percentage of total
annual recharge. If the long-term recharge rate should change, these flow
rights would be adjusted accordingly. As long as surface drainage is not
a problem, carryover of unused flow rights from year to year would be
allowed. '0 The property rights would be allocated to individuals in pro-
portion to their pumping during some base period. Using the Salinas
Valley groundwater basin and a base year of 1989, the deeds or water
'
0 Surface drainage is only a problem if unused flow rights are not
returned to the aquifer. Unused flow rights would be lost if they did not
percolate back into the aquifer.
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rights using Smith's [Ref. 32:p. 7-101 model would be determined as
follows:
1. Individual proportions of the flow in acre-feet would be a function of
the total use in 1989, which was 659,400 acre-feet. Let the amount
used by the jth individual be xi acre-feet. Then the proportion of
total use by individual i in 1989 would have been xJ/659,400, which
is denoted pi.
2. The flow right would be based on a fraction of long-run average net
recharge to the basin, which has been estimated at 622,900 acre-
feet. Therefore, the property right of individual i to an annual flow is
ri = 622,900pj thousand acre-feet per year in perpetuity.
3. The stock right would convey a right to a share of the basin's stock,
which was estimated to be approximately 1.05 million acre-feet in
1989. The share of this stock granted to individual i would also be
pi, giving a right to pump from the stock no more than a total of Ri -
1.05pj million acre-feet at any time in the future.
The initial allocation of water rights is arbitrary and primarily a
question of equity. To assign the water deed by the appropriative doctrine
usually means that potential claimants must show evidence of use. If the
base period is a future known period, individuals may maximize their
pumping during this period in order to receive a maximum allocation.
Under this scheme, individuals who had adopted conservation methods
prior to the base year would be penalized because their consumptive
rates would be lower.
To keep this from occurring, the base year could be derived from an
average of the previous ten years or some other large period of time,
making the process fairer. Another possibility could be to devise a system
to compensate individuals who have adopted conservation methods prior
to the base year through "water credits." These credits would give con-
servation-minded farmers additional flow rights and penalize individuals
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who were wasteful of water. Measuring and rating conservation methods
to assign water credits would involve some subjectivity. Therefore, great
care would have to be taken in assigning water credits, if such a system
were used.
Another alternative to the initial allocation of water rights would be
to assign water deeds to land owners in proportion to land overlaying the
aquifer. This method of allocation would avoid the incentive to waste
water in establishing a priority right. Water rights would be sold with
land. New users'I who did not exist before the base year when the initial
allocation was performed must acquire, through purchase, existing stock
and flow rights. This would only be economically efficient if a market
were established for exchanging groundwater rights.
H. ENFORCEMENT OF WATER RIGHTS
Enforcement is critical for groundwater rights to be an effective
alternative to centralized management. Several methods could be devised
to enforce private water rights. Pumps could be metered. Each owner of a
right could begin with an initial stock. At the end of the year, an adjust-
ment would be made to the owner's stock account by subtracting the
amount pumped and adding the appropriate share of aggregate natural
recharge. Because the latter component is a random variable from year
to year, observed stream flows or other sources of recharge would be
11 New users are defined as users whose land doesn't overlie the
aquifer, or old land owners who changed uses to something that requires
more water than they own.
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used as an estimate. In the Salinas Valley, return flows from irrigation
would be of consequence. They would be applied to reduce the subtrac-
tion from pumping. A method to maintain the integrity of the meters and
to maintain control over the construction of new wells would have to be
devised. With additional manning, the Monterey County Flood Control
and Water Conservation District could undertake the responsibility of
monitoring wells, estimating return flows, and adjusting stock and flow
accounts. Legal authority would have to be granted to levy fines on viola-
tors for pumping more than the amount owned.
I. THE EFFECT OF STOCK AND FLOW RIGHTS
Fractor [Ref. 33:pp. 405-4121 has shown that an advantage to priva-
tizing groundwater rights through the establishment of stock and flow
rights is the consequent flexibility in the face of changing economic con-
ditions. In Figure 3.4, the initial stock of ground water is larger than the
stock that would exist in the long-run steady state (where use equals
recharge). Time paths for groundwater pumping and groundwater stock
in the case of increased water demand with full stock-flow rights (FSF)
are illustrated in Figure 3.4. Suppose the demand for water increases.
The pumping per period would increase from FSF0 to FSF1 . This increase
in pumping reflects the increase in water demand. Groundwater stock
would decrease from FSF0 to FSF1 . In this case, the stock would be used
because FSF1 is below the periodic recharge level. The full stock-flow
rights would allow for complete adjustment to this increased demand.


















FSFo = Full stock-flow rights prior to demand change
FSF1 = Full stock-flow rights after demand change
So = Initial stock
SSs = Steady state stock
W = Periodic recharge
Tj = Time of demand change
Figure 3.4. Time Paths for Groundwater Pumping and Stocks With
Full Stock-Flow Rights: Increased Water Demand
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water shifting from the future to the present and some previously unused
stock rights will be exercised. We implicitly assume that some stock
rights will still exist at the steady state. A steady state for stock rights
mearis that the "stock" of water in the aquifer remains relatively constant
because individuals will exercise their flow rights first. Given that the
marginal cost of extraction likely rises at an increasing rate as the stock
diminishes, economic exhaustion will occur before physical exhaustion of
the groundwater stock. Individuals will stop pumping prior to the physi-
cal exhaustion because their pumping cost will increase to a point where
it is no longer worth pumping. If there are no other alternative sources of
water (e.g., surface water or desalinization of sea water), then the uses
will be forced to use less water or go out of business entirely.
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IV. WATER MARKETS AND MARKET ACTIVITY
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MARKETS
The force driving the actions of economic agents, which manifest
themselves in markets and the price mechanism, is a search for the
wealth created by the scarcity problem. Markets are based on a system of
property rights for those resources and goods that are scarce. The rights
to property allow the owner to exclude users, husband resources and
enhance wealth. However, there is no private market activity involving
these property rights unless they are transferred. Thus, the presence of
private transferability distinguishes the market solution from the other
methods of allocating water. [Ref. 31:p. 102]
Property right theories have had considerable success in explaining
the development in markets and other institutional arrangements across
a broad range of situations [Ref. 26:p. 347]. Demsetz [Ref. 34] has stud-
ied the relationship between institutions and market formation. Two fun-
damental principles can be distilled from Demsetz's work. The first is
that, as property rights become more valuable, more effort will be devoted
to the property definition and protection of property rights. Demsetz
shows that Canadian Indians developed property rights for hunting
grounds as the value of beaver pelts increased due to an emerging fur
trade. Anderson and Hill [Ref. 35:p. 1631 extend this idea by applying
their theory of the supply and demand of property rights activities to
western cattle ranching. They point out that as the value of land and
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horses (a determinant of demand for the associated property rights) rose
and fell, there was a corresponding rise and fall in the expenditure of
resources on property rights definition and enforcement. Similarly, as the
cost of property rights to land fell with the introduction of barbed wire,
more fencing was used to define and enforce property rights. [Ref. 3 1:p.
2501
Demsetz's second point is that enforcement costs are a function of
the structure of the property right. Because of the difficulties in defining
stock and flow rights, the enforcement costs for these rights would be
high. Umbeck [Ref. 3 6 :p. 4211 shows that during the California gold
rush, the earlier contract choice of sharing the product of a claim was
abandoned as the mining population (and stealing) increased, thereby
increasing the cost of enforcing this type of agreement. Therefore, the
ability to clearly define water rights and monitor the exchange of these
rights is essential to a market. [Ref. 31:p. 252]
Property rights for water would become more valuable in two cases:
if the current supply of water in the aquifer is decreased, or if the
demand for water increased. The supply of water could decrease under
two conditions. First, If the recharge rate decreased during the year, the
yearly allocation of water recharge would be smaller. Thus, the water
available would have more value. Second, if demand for water increases
(perhaps as a result of an introducing a highly valued, water-intensive
crop), the stock of water would decrease because farmers would be more
likely to exercise their stock rights. This would increase both the values
of flow rights and the remaining stock rights.
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To recognize the efficiency of a free market system for water, it is
useful to look at two aspects of water allocation. The first aspect is the
effect of water management methods in evaluating the external costs of
water extraction. These costs are the externalities which individuals
must bear as a result of independent pumping. The second is the relative
economic efficiency of each allocation method. The allocation efficiency is
measured by evaluating each method in terms of maximizing societal
benefits. Societal value in markets is reflected through the pricing sys-
tem. Therefore, in this case, societal benefits are equated with net reve-
nue maximization (total revenue minus social costs).
B. TAX APPROACH TO WATER ALLOCATION
One alternative to a free market for water is the water tax approach.
Figure 4.1 shows the private marginal cost curves for a broccoli grower,
PMCi, and society's marginal cost, SMCj, to illustrate the economics of
this approach. The difference between the social marginal cost curve and
the private marginal cost curve for the broccoli grower is the social cost
resulting from the pumping actions of the broccoli grower. The broccoli
grower creates a social or external cost because his pumping affects the
pumping cost of the individuals around him. The individuals on the edge
of the aquifer are most affected by others' pumping, so the social cost to
them is the greatest. If we could determine the amount of the external or
social cost for each water consumer, we could set the tax at this level.
The revenues generated by the tax could be used to compensate sec-
ondary parties harmed by pumping water from the aquifer or to finance a
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wide range of water projects, including applied research on better meth-






Figure 4.1. BroccoU Grower's Marginal Cost Curves
The tax approach would promote efficient allocation by altering sev-
eral economic incentives in a highly desirable way. First, the water tax
would increase the cost of producing water-intensive crops, causing the
supply of these crops to decline. Second, the water tax would give farms
an economic incentive to use agricultural methods that consume less
water (e.g., reduce double cropping, switch to less-water-consumptive
crops). A properly set tax would approximate the ideal price and output
conditions, as in Figure 4.2. In Figure 4.2, the supply curve S2 is the
ideal, reflecting the social and private cost of pumping water, and incor-
porating conservation methods that are chosen to minimize the sum of
those costs. SI, however, reflects purely the private costs and production
techniques chosen to minimize only the private costs. Thus, the ideal
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output is Q2 and the optimal cost (and price) is P2 . But when the pro-
ducer is not responsible for social costs, we can expect the larger output,
Q I, and the much larger social marginal cost, MCs, even though the buy-
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Figure 4.2. Supply, Externalities, and Minimum-Cost Production
Third, since farms would be able to lower their tax bills by reducing
water consumption, a market for innovative water conservation tech-
niques would exist. As long as it was cheaper for the firm to incorporate
water conservation techniques than to pay the water tax, the farm would
opt for improved water conservation. Entrepreneurs would be induced to
develop low-cost irrigation and water conservation devices and market
them to firms that would now have a strong Incentive to reduce their
water consumption.
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The water tax is appealing because it can, in theory, be efficient, but
there are three common objections. First, an efficient tax is one based on
the external pumping costs incurred by other water consumers. Without
knowing what these external costs are, an efficient tax cannot be figured
or implemented. Determining external costs is difficult. Farmers pumping
at different locations in the valley will be affected by external costs in
different degrees. Farmers closer to the edge of the aquifer will absorb a
greater social cost because their pumping cost will be most affected by
others' pumping. To be truly equitable, a tax would have to be calculated
for each farmer based on the degree to which his pumping affected other
farmers' pumping. The revenue from the tax would have to be distributed
differently to each farmer, based on the external effect of others' pumping
on his own pumping costs. This problem could be somewhat alleviated if
the valley were divided into zones based on the external costs imposed
and the external effect absorbed by each farmer.
A second objection to the water tax alternative is that it requires
monitoring the amount of water pumped. But any efficient strategy
requires the monitoring agency to know how much is being pumped, so
this objection does not weaken the tax option relative to other strategies.
A more telling, third objection is a political one: to switch from a situation
in which the pumper does not pay any external costs to one in which
external costs are paid to the tax collector by pumpers would involve a
huge transfer of wealth.
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C. MAXIMUM WATER CONSUMPTION STANDARD
Although economics suggests that the water tax approach would be
more efficient than other centralized water management practices, a
maximum water usage standard is often suggested [Ref. 24:p. 531. In this
case, the regulatory agency forces all pumpers to reduce their pumping
to a designated level. Pumpers who are unable to meet the standard are
required to terminate pumping, or are penalized for continued pumping.
The problem with this approach is that it is inflexible, especially
when changes occur in water demand. Figure 4.3 illustrates this condi-
tion for changes in demand. Suppose the quantity of water being pumped
were fixed at ql and demand for water increased from d1 to d2 as a result
of a market change (for example, vegetable producers in Florida had
unseasonably cold weather, so the demand for vegetables from the Sali-
nas Valley increased). Pumpers would be willing to pay higher pumping
costs P2 to pump the additional water, but they are unable to because of
the quantity is fixed at qj. Conversely, if demand decreased, from d 1 to
d3, the pumpers would have no incentive to reduce water consumption.
D. WATER MARKZTS: A CASE COMPARISON
We can examine the effects of each one of these methods in terms of
economic efficiency by presenting a simple case of two different farms,
each using different amounts of water and producing different crops. Fig-
ure 4.4 illustrates the farms' total annual revenue curves. The total
annual revenue curves show the amount of revenue gained as a function
of the amount of water used for production. The total revenue curve
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Figure 4.3. Maximum Water Consumption Standard Approach




WATER (in acre feet per month)
Figure 4.4. Total Revenue for Farms A/B
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shows that farm A would maximize revenues at 10 acre-feet of water a
month and farm B would maximize revenue at 40 acre-feet per month.
Water used in excess of these amounts would cause revenues to decrease
because additional water would not increase crop output, but total
pumping costs would continue to increase.
To compare the efficiency of each farm with regard to water use,
each farm's marginal net revenue curve must be examined. Marginal net
revenue in this case is defined as the additional revenue generated with
each additional increment of water used. Figure 4.5 depicts the marginal
net revenue curves for farms A and B. Mathematically, these curves are
derived from the total revenue curve by taking the first derivative of each
total revenue curve. In this case, the equations for the marginal net reve-
nue are: MNRa = 10 - w and MNRb = 4 - . 1w, where w = acre-feet of
water. The marginal net revenue curves still show that both farms maxi-
mize their revenue when 10 and 40 acre feet per month, respectively, are
used. The slopes of the marginal net revenue curves are different show-
ing that the value of an additional increment of water varies between
farms. The slopes of these curves are based on the type of crop farmed,
the efficiency of the farm's irrigation system and water conservation
methods, the market price of the crops farmed, and the fertility of the
soil.
When the supply of water is greater than the sum of all farms' opti-
mal usage values, farms A and B will choose to use 10 and 40 acre-feet
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Figure 4.5. Marginal Net Revenue for Farms A and B
consumption may be to set a limit for each farmer. For example, an
institutional action may have each farmer reduce water consumption by
10 percent. At this level of reduction, farm A would consume nine acre-
feet of water and Farm B would consume 36 acre-feet of water. Figure 4.6
illustrates this. The total revenue is determined by calculating the to area
under the marginal net revenue curves. The total revenue generated
under these conditions would be $128.7. This represents the area under
the marginal net revenue curve between 0 and 9 for farm A and 0 and 36
for farm B.
The purpose of any water management policy should be to maximize
the total net revenues of water. This is one of the characteristics of a
market. The market transmits information through the price system
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Figure 4.6. Marginal Net Revenue for Farms A and B Water Limitation
(Reduction by 10%)
net revenue would indicate that the water was being used in a way that
society most valued. Under the trading of water rights condition, changes
in social marginal costs and marginal net revenue would be realized by
individuals willing to trade and the market would make this correction.
The 10 percent reduction does not maximize the total net revenue
for each farm at that level of water consumption. Each farm's net revenue
is not maximized because farm A and farm B have different marginal
values for water. Assume that now farm A and farm B own water rights
for nine and 36 acre-feet of water, respectively. Under these conditions,
the farms will try to use water where their net marginal revenues are
equal to each other. Recalling that MNRa = 10 -W and MNRb - 4 -. 1W,
and that farm A and B own water rights that total to 45 acre feet (Wa +
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Wb = 45 acre-feet). We can solve for Wa and Wb when marginal net reve-
nues are equal. In this simple case, farm A's and farm B's marginal net
revenues are equal when farm B uses 35.45 acre-feet of water and farm A
uses 9.55 acre-feet of water, as shown in Figure 4.7. Therefore, to obtain
the same 10 percent reduction, Farm A would be willing to buy .55 acre-
feet of water from farm B and farm B would be willing to sell that same
amount to farm A. This assumes there are no transaction costs. Total
revenue generated by the two farms when they operate at these points
after the exchange is $128.9. At this level of water use, the total net reve-
nues are maximized and neither party can realize any gains from further
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Figure 4.7. Marginal Net Revenue for Farms A and B
($0.45 Tax Applied)
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The tax approach to water allocation can also provide net revenue
maximization. If the institu tion setting the tax could perfectly predict the
revenues for all parties, it could set a tax that would maximize net reve-
nues. In this example, a tax set at $.45 per acre-foot would cause farms
A and B to use water at the same level as they did when water rights
were traded. The problem with the tax approach is twofold. First, there
are more than two farms in the Salinas Valley. Since each farm's net
revenue must be known to the tax agency, it would be very difficult to get
the data needed to determine the tax at which net revenue maximization
occurs. Second, the tax approach is inflexible when there are changes in
the social marginal cost of water (supply) or the marginal net revenue
(demand). For example, if either farm changes its net revenue curve (by
changes in crop type or improved irrigation methods), the tax would have
to be recalculated. The optimal tax rate should equal the external costs
associated with the quantity of water pumped. As the demand for water
increases and farmers start pumping more water, the optimal tax should
increase. Thus, the tax would have to be recalculated, unless it were
stated as a function of the total quantity of water pumped. Changes in
supply introduce similar problems. As the supply of water decreases,
external pumping costs increase for a given quantity of water pumped.
Thus, the optimal tax would increase and so have to be recalculated.
Given the three potential methods of water allocation, the tax
approach, the maximum water consumption approach, and the market
approach. the market anproach provides the most efficient allocation of
scarce water resources under continually changing conditions.
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E. WATER PRICING AND WATER MARKETS
Water prices in a free market organize economic activity in three
ways: (1) they transmit information, (2) they provide an incentive to adopt
those methods of production that are least costly and thereby use availa-
ble resources for the most highly valued purpose, and (3) they determine
who gets how much of the resource. A market for water rights would be
efficient because it would consider the marginal value of water to each
user. In such a market, water users would exchange water rights until
their marginal benefits are equal. As shown in the previous section, if
farmer A can benefit more from using an additional unit of water than
farmer B, farmer A would be willing to purchase that unit from B. For
farmer B to be willing to sell that unit to farmer A. he must at least
receive his marginal value for water. In a market, this is how water prices
would be determined. Further, the kinds of crops that require a lot of
water would become more expensive and would carry higher prices than
those that required less water, so consumers would be induced to buy
more of the latter. The advantage of the market system over the tax sys-
tem is that not only does the market encourage conservation (because
unused water rights can be sold and a profit can be made), but the water
is allocated to its most profitable use. In an agricultural area with limited
water resources, like the Salinas Valley, society is better off if the limited
supply of water is used on the rrm._st productive soil and crop combina-
tions in order to maximize agricultural output. The market will make this
allocation by transmitting information through the prices for goods pro-
duced with water resources and the prices of tradable water rights
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themselves. Economic order emerges as the unintended consequence of
the actions of many people, each seeking his own interest. The price of
water will reflect the scarcity of the resource to those owning the water
rights.
F. ROLE OF WATER EXCHANGES
The formation of a water exchange or organized market can enor-
mously facilitate the transmission of information. A formal water
exchange would provide an institution through which farmers could buy
and sell water rights. It would also provide an institution for enforcing
those rights. Water accounts for each water user could be kept. As
exchanges took place, water accounts between the traders would be
adjusted to reflect their new balances. A water exchange could also pro-
vide an institution which would reallocate flow rights every year. As dis-
cussed previously, flow accounts would be calculated and credited each
year based on the amount of recharge for the year. Stock rights would
remain relatively constant and only change when stock rights were
exercised. When stock rights were exercised, this transaction would be
recorded in the user's stock account. Prices for water would be tracked
and set each day on the water exchange. Flow and stock rights would be
traded much like commercial stock on a stock exchange. The exchange
would provide a clearing house for potential buyers and sellers of water
rights and also provide uniformity so that all exchanges would occur
under the same conditions and so that there would be no abuse of rights
or black markets for water.
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It would be possible to account for water rights using a single
account- one which holds the initial stock amount and is simply added
to by flow replenishments and deducted from by metered pumping. How-
ever. having a separate stock account would make it easier to determine
the aquifer level at a given time. The separate stock account also would
provide a baseline figure or safety level for water in the aquifer.
G. BARRIERS TO A MARKET SYSTEM
A new way of doing business, especially one which would require a
significant departure from current procedures, does not get implemented
without encountering barriers. The major barriers associated with the
implementation of a groundwiater market system are: the task of making
the initial allocation of water rights equitable, the lack of laws and insti-
tutions to administer the program, and the potential unwillingness of
voters in the Salinas Valley to accept this type of change.
1. Initial Allocation of Rights
The initial method used to allocate stock and flow rights may be
fundamental to the success of a groundwater market system. The initial
allocation of these rights would be one of the most difficult and critical
tasks to be accomplished in the establishment of a free-market system
for water rights. Parties in the Salinas Valley receiving a comparatively
small initial allocation of water rights might perceive that the state, by
moving to a groundwater market system. has given something of sub-
stantial value to those who initially receive larger water allocations. In
fact, there would not be any new wealth created by the initial allocations.
Careful assignment of initial water rights could ever, allow the current
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distribution of that wealth to remain unchanged. Breaking the tie that
currently exists between land and water will create new wealth only
through the elimination of inefficient water use. It is important to under-
stand that most of the potential wealth arising from water use already
exists; it would only be made more visible by a water market.
2. Legal and Political Barriers
Currently, the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Con-
servation District has no legal authority to establish a free market system
for water. Such authority would require political reforms at the state
level. In addition, the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Con-
servation District, or some other institutijn, would have to:
a. Collect data on water use.
b. Establish and maintain data on the number of wells.
c. Provide a physical market for the exchange of water rights.
d. Provide a means for the enforcement of these rights.
e. Collect data necessary to estimate annual aquifer replenishment
flow.
f. Collect data necessary to estimate irrigation returns to the aquifer,
and to monitor the quality of those returns.
As mentioned previously, the Monterey County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District could do this, but not without a substantial
increase in staffing and authority. Obtaining this additional staff would
be difficult under the current constrained fiscal environment.
With a water market system, an exchange would have to be
established so there would be a way to trade water rights. This would be
similar to the stock market, but would be specifically for water rights
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trading. Once again, the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Con-
servation District could do this, but not without a substantial increase in
staffing.
The members of the local farming community will probably
oppose any change in the current management of water if they think it
will mean that they have to pay any more for their water than the present
standby charges. Since the Salinas Valley farmers are currently not pay-
ing anything for groundwater itself (standby charges pay for water
distribution, not water), any new distribution system, whatever its cost,
would probably be seen as a potential reduction in farm profits.
A water market system might not be politically palatable either.
Although the average citizen might feel that the program was in the best
interest of the community, the strong and wealthy growers carry sub-
stantial influence in this largely agricultural community. Strong agricul-
tural lobbyists could make it very uncomfortable for any politician sup-
porting legislation that was perceived to have the potential of making
crops more costly to grow.
3. Constituents' Acceptance
Although most private residents of the Salinas Valley realize
that something has to be done to conserve water, they will probably not
be receptive 1o a program that might require them to pay higher taxes to
get the agricultural industry to conserve water. These higher taxes would
be required to support additional government personnel to operate and
monitor the market. Most private residents feel that they are already
doing their part in the crusade to conserve water.
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Many cities that get their water from the aquifer in the Salinas
Valley have already imposed an across-the-board percentage cut in water
use or have raised the price per gallon to discourage excessive use. Some
cities, such as Marina, have formed a 'water conservation task force" to
determine additional means to conserve water through home, business,
landscaping, and local government agency conservation measures.
Requiring the local residential property owner to pay additional taxes to
support the market system might seem unfair because he is already
doing his share, and it is the agricultural growers that are using the
lion's share of the valley's water and causing the problems.
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V. SUMMARY
This thesis examined the groundwater resources problem in the
Salinas Valley and analyzed a market alternative for allocating these
resources in the agricultural community. The thesis covered three major
areas: a discussion of the current drought conditions in the Salinas Val-
ley and the importance of the agricultural community to the state and
local economy, a brief description of groundwater law and models, and
finally a comparison of a free-market system of allocating groundwater
resources to both a tax system (where groundwater is taxed as it is
extracted) and a maximum water consumption standard system (where a
limit is set on the amount of water that can be extracted).
The Salinas Valley, which covers an area of 285,000 acres, enjoys a
mild Mediterranean climate and benefits from normally moderate year-
round temperatures. Agriculture is the number one industry in the Sali-
nas Valley and has a significant impact on the county as a whole. In
terms of annual dollar value, lettuce is by far the leading crop and has
contributed to making Monterey County the number one vegetable pro-
ducing county in the nation. Because agriculture has a great impact on
the entire county, and because Monterey County is the largest vegetable-
producing county in the United States, issues that affect the agricultural
community also greatly affect the entire Monterey economic community
and the nation as a whole.
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Groundwater is essentially the only source of water for the Salinas
Valley. For several decades. water demand in Monterey County has
exceeded the supply, resulting in groundwater overdraft, seawater intru-
sion, shortages during dry years, and increased water costs. The water
problem in the Monterey County is principally linked to the increasing
acreage planted with vegetables. These crops not only require a large irri-
gation application during their growing cycle but their short growing
cycle and the favorable local climate also promote double-cropping.
This study identified several obstacles in the formation of mar-
ketable groundwater rights. A market for groundwater requires that
groundwater rights be clearly defined and enforceable. Defining and
enforcing groundwater rights is difficult because of the inherent uncer-
tainty in measuring aquifer stock levels and natural recharge. A second
obstacle in establishing groundwater rights is the requirement to monitor
groundwater pumping by water rights holders. These two obstacles must
be overcome before accurate stock and flow rights can be defined and
before a market for water rights can be established.
Our assessment of the implementation of a market system for
groundwater in the Salinas Valley has shown that. in theory, a market
system is more efficient than the current management techniques being
used by centralized government agencies. This thesis compared two
aspects of water allocation under three different management alterna-
tives. The three market alternatives are: a free-market system for ground-
water rights: a tax approach: and a maximum water consumption stan-
dard approach. Two aspects of water allocation were compared under
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each of these management alternatives: the external cost imposed on
society resulting from groundwater extraction and the relative economic
efficiency of each allocation method. Given the three potential methods of
water allocation, the market approach provides the most efficient alloca-
tion of scarce water resources under continually changing conditions of
supply and demand.
A water market system is not the only way to proceed in the valley's
quest to conserve its precious resource, water. It is not even the easiest
to establish and operate. But it is the most efficient and, if properly run,
the fairest. In some ways, whatever decisions the policy makers and
leaders of the communities within the valley make to manage this prob-
lem are not as important as Just making a decision. According to the
Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District [Ref.
3 7 :p. 1A], as of November 1990, the Salinas Valley water table had plum-
meted to the lowest levels in its recorded history. The signs seem to be
that the situation is not ge Ing better, so some sort of action must be
taken. Water marketing could play a significant role in fairly providing
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